INTRODUCTION
Professor Wolfke's outstanding expertise did not only rely on his insightful studies on international customary law 1 . He established his reputation as a great international lawyer even at the very beginning of his academic career when examining the structure of international society, which was a PhD project prepared under supervision of Professor Stanisław Hubert 2 . This outstanding début was followed by several further analyses of the said topic 3 . Despite the passing of time, the validity of Professor Wolfke's insightful conclusions remain intact. They still provide a valuable background for scrutinizing the influence of the Great Powers on international courts, as is to be demonstrated below.
In this study, we analyse the position of the Great Powers from the perspective of international judiciary. At first sight, there is an inevitable controversy or even a contradiction in such a setting. In this regard, one is simply tempted to repeat after Max Huber that, in the case of a judicial body it must be assumed that the influence of power is entirely eliminated 4 . In a similar vein, G. Schwarzenberger in his famous study on the structure of world society while identifying an international oligarchy is adamantly clear that ' [i] f States agree to the judicial settlement of a dispute, the parties, DOI: 10.1515/wrlae-2018-0049 *University Professor, Department of International and European Law, Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics, University of Wrocław, bartlomiej.krzan@uwr.edu.pl, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3964-114X. 1 See in particular the seminal study: K Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (1st ed 1964 , 2nd ed 1993 . Further references refer to the second edition. 2 K Wolfke, Great and Small Powers in International Law from 1814 to 1920 (From the 5 . However, any examination of such matters needs to give way to reality, which shows at least two potential avenues of influence over international courts and tribunals to be exercised by the Great Powers: domination with regard to their composition and the intervention in the proceedings conducted in front of them. Both areas of such influence are scrutinized below.
Of course, there exists no single model of international judiciary, each court or tribunal having normally some own specific features. Despite such differences and bearing in mind the difficulties in generalizations, the present paper intends to offer a more general perspective on the position of the Great Powers in present international courts and tribunals.
I. GREAT POWERS
For our examination, it is crucial to first define Great Powers. They have been traditionally referred to as puissances à intérêts généraux, since they have been conducting actions in all possible respects, even those not necessarily connected with their own interests 6 . The formula used by R. Albrecht-Carrié, a diplomacy historian, is also similar, as he speaks of them having "automatically a voice in all affairs, by contrast with a Power of lower rank, or Power with limited interests" 7 . In this regard, there have also been other designations, like puissance principale, grande puissance, puissance de premier ordre, puissance de premier rang. They all, however, are not as popular as the former term.
There might be different conditions for qualifying the superior position of a State. Most frequently Great Powers would rely on their contribution in a victory over the common enemy, or simply on their power and the duties and responsibilities allegedly connected with it 8 . One may of course, also offer other grounds for differing rights and obligations 9 , as e. Jessup, who noted that "Great powers have power because they are great and not because a skillful draftsman has invented an ingenious formula" 12 . Nowadays special attention needs to be paid also to institutional developments. Professor Wolfke is of course right when underlining that in consequence of changes in the structure of international society and of the creation of the United Nations, the position of smaller nations has alteredas the possibility of the big powers openly imposing rules on minor nations has considerably diminished 13 . Nevertheless, this does not mean that the role of those big powers is today the same as that of other states 14 . Crucial in this regard is especially the United Nations Security Council, which may be regarded by some scholars as "international government of the Great Powers"
15 . For the present examination it would be of particular importance to look at its influence on the judicial proceedings, as is scrutinized in part 4 of the present contribution.
II. COMPOSITION
None of the instruments establishing and governing any international court or a tribunal would explicitly reserve seats for particular states 16 . However, there has been some important practice developed in that direction. A typical example, in addition to the courts analysed below, is the Appellate Body within the framework of the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement, which has always comprised the US and the European Union.
In general, equality of States and their shared rights and duties may be considered essential for success of international judicial settlement 17 . But it may also appear that the Great Powers do not consider and value the equality in the same manner as small states. On the other hand, one may rely on thoughtful considerations by E.D. Dickinson, according 19 . Out of many respective proposals made during the Hague Conference, one mentioned the American draft, consulted with the British and the German, according to which the projected Court would be composed of the permanent judges appointed by the Great Powers and also judges from other (smaller) States, elected in rotation, the term of their office being proportional to such factors as population, territory, industrialization and trade 20 . Due to the surrounding controversies it was no possible to finish the preparatory work.
Some (limited) progress was made with the International Prize Court. Its statute, however, also contained a solution not easily acceptable to all states. Accordingly, the International Prize Court was to consist of 15 judges, with a possibility for them to be replaced by deputy judges, in case of the former being absent or prevented from sitting 21 . According to Article 15 of the XII Hague Convention of 1907, the judges appointed by eight contracting parties, namely: Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia, were to be always summoned to sit. On the other hand, the judges and deputy judges appointed by the other contracting parties were to sit by rotation. Eventually, the plans to establish the Prize Court ended with a failure as its statute did not enter into force.
The reasons for the two failed attempts to bring about international courts were skillfully summarized by O.M. Hudson, who emphasized the difficulty in reconciling the demands of the more powerful States for certain representation and the insistence of other States on the principle of equality 22 . Luckily enough, the difficulties in establishing another court, i.e. the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) were overcome. Professor Wolfke was certainly right in his assessment that the success in creating the PCIJ was only possible through concessions made to extra-juridical requirements, mainly caused by the mistrust and prestige of the Great Powers 23 . The problems of composition and the methods of electing judges were the most difficult issues during the negotiations. To avoid the causes of failure in 1907, it was necessary to give them permanent judges in a way acceptable to other States 24 . The respective privileged position for Great Powers could be justified on several grounds, e.g. relying on the extent of territory, population, industry and trade. Other reasons, newly put forward, could be the potential 19 MO Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920 -1942 . A Treatise (1943 impracticability of the Court without judges from the Great Powers 25 . According to Hans Wehberg, the only influence which at first sight could be decisive in favour of allotting a larger number of judges to the Great Powers would perhaps be the fact that the Great Powers resort to the Court more frequently 26 . But the whole hitherto practice (of the PCIJ and then of the ICJ) has shown the constant reluctance of the Great Powers in that respect.
The Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, Baron Descamps, was well aware that without concessions to the Great Powers the Court would not come into being and therefore considered that "one should reconcile the principle of juridical equality with certain guarantees which should be given to the Great Powers"
27 . The proposal of Descamps, accompanied by the whole surrounding discussion, clearly showed that the only true aim of Article 9 was to ensure that the Great Powers would have permanent seats on the Court 28 . In the Protocols of the Committee one may find the following summary: "The President thought the clause which he proposed with reference to the representation of civilizations and legal systems would ensure in so far as humanly possible the desired result, that is the representation of the great Powers"
29 . This goes in line with the argument by Hans Kelsen:
"Since any great power represents a main form of civilization and one of the principal legal systems of the world, the effect of this provision is that in fact each great power has a political claim to be represented in the Court by a judge of its nationality. This claim has been carefully respected by the League of Nations. It is hardly compatible with the principle that an independent judge is no representative of a state, or of a civilization, or of a legal system, and it is certainly not in harmony with the principle that the judges should be elected 'regardless of their nationality'".
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Be that as it may, from the very beginning the representation of all Great Powers has been identified with representation of legal systems 31 . It was not, of course, the one and only mechanism aimed at securing the permanent seats for the Great Powers. Another device serving the same purpose was the system of double election, i.e. double election was also designed to protect the interests of the Great Powers, which were assumed to predominate in the smaller electoral organ and therefore to be in a position to exert influence over the larger and more representative electoral organ 33 . The model of selection for the PCIJ was largely and simply followed by the drafters of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, any privileged position of the Great Powers on the Court was generally criticized at the San Francisco Conference. In the discussions in the Committee IV/1 three groups of views on the election of the members of the Court were formulated. According to the first view, supported by the smaller States, the election should be limited only to the General Assembly, considering such a method to be more democratic, while the system of double election would give the Great Powers greater influence and a double vote in violation of the principle of equality 34 . Finally, there were proposals to discard the differences between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council for the election of members of the Court. The third view eventually prevailed and thus the only concession that had been made concerned no distinction to be made between permanent and non-permanent members of the Council 35 . This exception may have resulted from the willingness to guarantee impartiality in the election of judges by removing any differences of status between members of the Security Council in this respect 36 . It is also important to note that the election of judges is the only instance under the Charter of the United Nations where the Council reaches its decision by an absolute majority vote.
Generally speaking, the effect of Article 9 was to postulate the political factor in the distribution of places in the Court 37 . When considering the reality that the permanent members of the Security Council each always have a judge on the Court, Kolb speaks of "an unwritten rule of the Charter and the Statute" 38 . According to Rosenne, it has always been accepted as essential to ensure proper Great Power representation on the Court 39 . In view respect for its sentences, which could not be put into execution without the all-important support of their military, economic and financial powers. An empirical study on the selection of international judges reveals the perception of "the apparent sense of entitlement" of the Great Powers on one hand, and the respectively provoked annoyance on the other 42 . It is quite telling that when Judge Donoghue was elected to fill in the empty seat at the bench of the International Court of Justice due to resignation by Judge Thomas Buergenthal, the Iranian delegation in strong words expressed the dissatisfaction toward the privileged situation of the "permanent US seat" underlining that "articles 2 and 9 of the Court's Statute provide the only criteria for electing qualified candidates to the post, and any practice or precedent to the contrary that may imply or bring in other elements other than geographical distribution and that could grant a special privilege or privileged treatment to certain States is not acceptable" 43 .
A more pragmatic view, attempting at reconciling both provisions has been recently offered by Georges Abi Saab, whose idea was "not to eliminate politics from the elections, which is a contradiction in terms, but to improve and widen the range of nominations so that political choice can be exercised from among a sufficient number of highly qualified candidates" 44 . The struggle for the professional qualifications has had a long history, to mention only the deliberations within the Institut de droit international which led to the adoption of the resolution on the composition of the . In a recent (2011) resolution of the Institut, adequate geographical representation within international courts and tribunals was mentioned with regard to selection of judges to international courts and tribunals. However, the resolution underlined that "The ability to exercise high jurisdictional functions shall nonetheless remain the paramount criterion for the selection of judges, as pointed out by the Institute in its 1954 Resolution" 47 . The reference to the preceding 1954 resolution comes as no surprise.
Nowadays, with the inclusion of other legal systems represented on the bench as the result of the loss of a predominantly European character, the Court has become less homogeneous. There are also other factors influencing the election process. Mackenzie is right in attributing the success of judicial candidates not only to their personal and professional qualities but also to the regional power of the state in question, its contribution to the budget of the court, the determination and the experience in that regard 48 . Such remarks are now partly undermined by the surprising non-election of the UK candidate in late 2017, which would thus mark a second exception to the P5s' general 'presence on the Bench'.
The validity of the conclusions drawn with regard to the ICJ might be, at least to some extent, extrapolated onto other international tribunals. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also relies on "the representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution" 49 . The former part of the quotation has been taken from Article 9 of the ICJ Statute, but in all other respects this provision differs fundamentally from Art. 9, since the principle of geographical distribution is referred to in Art. 3(2) of the ITLOS Statute and the nominations and elections in Art. 4, respectively 50 . However, it is also to be remarked that the British candidate for the first election to the ITLOS in 1996 (David Anderson) was only elected on the eighth ballot 51 . In the election of 2005 the very same person was replaced by the national of a land-locked State. Since then, the Hamburg Tribunal has been without any national from the UK, despite his mother country being traditionally considered the Queen of the Seas. 46 See Point 1 of the Resolution adopted at Session d'Aix-en-Provence in 1954 on Etude des amendements à apporter au Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice (Rapporteur: Max Huber), defining the respective criteria of selecting judges to the ICJ: "Sans préjudice de la nécessité d'assurer une certaine représentation géographique au sein de la Cour internationale de Justice comme prévue à l'article 9 du Statut, les juges à la Cour doivent être élus avant tout en fonction de leurs qualités individuelles en conformité avec l'article 2. A cet effet une précision en ce sens pourrait, en cas de révision du Statut, être utilement apportée à l'article 9". 47 In its turn, the Tokyo Tribunal was to "consist of not less than five, nor more than nine Members, appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from the names submitted by the Signatories to the Instrument of Surrender". In the Statutes of International Military Tribunals no qualifications of any kind were specified.
A different model was adopted in the 1990s for the International Criminal Tribunals established by the Security Council as the latter's subsidiary organs. Their statutes contain certain requirements for the judges. Both Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals are to be composed of independent judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State 52 . The judges must be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices 53 . The inclusion of such requirements marks a significant difference in comparison with the IMTs being often considered instruments of victors' justice. Contrary to the practice of appointing judges by the victorious states, for the two ad hoc Tribunals judges were to be elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council. Still, however, also with regard to the ad hoc tribunals established in 90s. one may again notice some overrepresentation of the powerful states 54 . As noted by A. Danner and E. Voeten, the major NATO member states had been de facto guaranteed judgeships and the same was generally true for the P5, with the Russian candidate, Valentin Kisilev, for the first election in 1993 as the only exception 55 . Judges of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) are appointed in a different manner. They are elected by the Assembly of State Parties, also on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The candidates must all be nationals of States-Parties, but they may be nominated by a State other than that of their nationality. According to Article 36(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, the judges are to be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices. In addition to this well-established classic formula, every candidate for election to the Court should either have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to 52 Under paragraph 8(a) of the same Article, the States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the need, within the membership of the Court, for: (i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world; (ii) Equitable geographical representation; and (iii) A fair representation of female and male judges. The introduction of gender equality is indeed a new factor, thus making the whole procedure of composing the bench more objective and professional. The newly introduced system was considered to work relatively successfully, even if the elections provided for some overrepresentation of the Western Europe and Other Governments Group over other regions 57 . Such constant improvements in composing the international criminal law courts and tribunals go hand in hand with the developments in the discipline, marking at the same time its own peculiarities given the differences to traditional international judiciary. In general, however, after the analysis of the practice of the international courts and tribunals mentioned above, one is tempted to again rely on the position of Max Huber, which is quite telling and worthy of being reproducing in extenso:
"The only interest which is really entitled to be decisive in the constitution of permanent courts concerns the excellence of the personnel of the court. If the lesser powers, by reason of their smaller share in the appointment of judges, cannot have complete confidence in the court, the objection must be met by directing attention to a suitable method of selecting the judges and to a comprehensive regulation of their qualifications, not by taking into account in the composition of the court an influence which, in the last instance, rests only upon political power entirely foreign to the idea of justice" 58 .
The ultimate goal, in other words, would be, to borrow from Sir Robert Jennings, the courts to be perceived as "being bigger than any particular bloc or ideological or political or economic interest, and as being truly representative of a law of 'ecumenical validity'" (in the latter case borrowing from Lord Asquith) 59 . The analysis above proves this true.
III. INTERVENTION IN THE PROCEEDINGS
Bearing in mind the nature of international judiciary, at least in its traditional sense, a Great Power could only have influence over the proceedings, in which it is a party to. But when standing before an international court a Great Power would lose the advantages it normally enjoyed.
In general, Great Powers are relatively reluctant towards international courts (as best manifested in the US' position towards the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ) and are rather seldom parties to the proceedings (cf. the Chinese approach). The attitude is, of course, individual and not a subject to all-too-easy generalizations (as exemplified by Russian reluctance towards the ICJ and -at the very same time -a more "open" approach towards the Hamburg Tribunal).
But states may also be interested in intervening in the proceedings. To give an example, any state may intervene in the proceedings in the sense of Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute. Taking such a role, a Great Power (as any other state), whose legal interest might be affected by a possible decision of the Court, would be enabled to participate in the main case in order to protect that interest 60 . The reasons for enabling intervention were perfectly identified by Judge Weeramantry in the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case 61 . In a similar vein, intervention has been also foreseen in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (although with some deviations from the original model, in particular with regard to the Tribunal's decision also being binding upon the intervener 62 ) 63 . There is, however, also some potential for the intervention of Great Powers acting in concert, in particular via an action by the United Nations Security Council. Here, again, the position might be a different one, when considering the Great Powers as a corporate entity, and not as an individual subject of action. What is meant here is a scenario of competing competences between the Security Council and an international tribunal.
With regard to the ICJ, it might be argued that parallel exercise of their functions, by the Court and the Council respectively, is incompatible with the primary responsibility of the Security Council 64 , and that the Court should accordingly abstain from adjudication when the Council is seized with the matter in question. Judge Alvarez in Anglo-Iranian Oil considered a similar scenario, accepting the predominance of the Security Council:
"If a case submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to world peace, the Security Council may seize itself of the case and put an end to the Court's jurisdiction. Such a position is also represented on the doctrinal plane. According to L. Delbez, the Council would enjoy complete discretion to remove a case from the Court's docket 66 . It has, furthermore, been suggested that when the Security Council considers that the discharge of its primary jurisdiction is obstructed by a parallel procedure before the International Court, the Council could on. the basis of Article 24(1) of the UN Charter. request the Court to suspend its proceedings pending the proceedings in the Council as well as order the disputing parties to refrain from going to the International Court 67 . Such proposals do not reflect the actual reality.
Complementarity of the respective roles of the ICJ and the Council has been stressed by the International Court of Justice on various other occasions, the Nicaragua case being probably the most open exposition on that 68 . In the merits phase of the same case, Judge Nagendra Singh alluded that " [t] he Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations has to promote peace, and cannot refrain from moving in that direction" 69 . A somewhat different and naturally more dangerous situation refers to the standing of the ad hoc tribunals. Both the Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals were created by the Security Council as the latter's subsidiary organs 70 . The subsidiary character of an organ does not, however, necessarily imply any presumption as to a measure of control that the principal organ may exercise over the subsidiary organ it has established, or as to the measure of autonomy such a subsidiary organ may enjoy vis-à-vis the principal organ (nor is it related to the respective subordinate character) 71 . More specifically, as D. Sarooshi contends, the exercise by the Tribunal of a judicial function which the Council does not itself possess is of crucial importance in ascribing to the Tribunal a degree of independence which prohibits interference by the Security Council in the conduct of individual cases 72 As a subsidiary organ of a judicial nature, it cannot be overemphasized that a fundamental prerequisite for its fair and effective functioning is its capacity to act autonomously. The Security Council does not perform judicial functions, although it has the authority to establish a judicial body. This serves to illustrate that a subsidiary organ is not an integral part of its creator but rather a satellite of it, complete and of independent character 74 .
On another occasion the judges of the ICTY paid attention to a particular dependence on the Security Council holding that "the constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize its "judicial character"". , a "creation" totally fashioned to the smallest detail by its "creator" and remaining totally in its power and at its mercy. But the Security Council not only decided to establish a subsidiary organ (the only legal means available to it for setting up such a body), it also clearly intended to establish a special kind of "subsidiary organ": a tribunal" 73 . 74 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskić, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of subpoena duces tecum, IT-95-14-PT, 18.07.1997 83 . Finally, one needs to mention the controversies surrounding the amendment of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The controversies around the arrest warrant for the President of Sudan stirred up a proposal by African states to amend this provision which relied on the disputable Uniting for Peace formula. Accordingly, where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security Council's responsibility 84 . Such a proposal is yet another reflection of the competition between the "exclusive" club dominated by the Great Powers on one hand and the definitely more democratic and egalitarian General Assembly on the other.
The chances for adopting the proposed amendment seem limited. Still, it is to be expected that Article 16 remains one of the most problematic provisions. All in all, while the preceding conclusion on the composition was very promising in the field of international criminal justice, the position of intervention is less positive.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is quite difficult to offer a better conclusion than that provided by the late Professor Wolfke over a half of century ago. He mentioned the Great Powers to be mainly responsible for the future of international judiciary. Then he concentrated on the World Court 85 but the validity of such a position may be easily extrapolated to other international courts. Definitely, the Great Powers have a significant future role, as may perhaps be most obviously seen with regard to the ICC, especially when introducing the institutional action taken by the Security Council, and the latter's deferral powers. Still, even when paying attention to such developments one is again tempted to borrow from a learned authority that "[e]very gesture on the [Great Powers'] part would 82 In this regard, one may note the unsuccessful attempts to defer the ICC investigation into the situation in Darfur (by the African Union), Kenya's request that the Security Council defer the Court's investigations into the 2007-8 post-election violence. 83 UN Doc. S/PV.7060, 11. 84 ICC-ASP/10/32. Annex V. 85 In fact, in the light of the practice of the Court and, in general, of the whole international reality, which is rather hostile to any privileges, the arguments for the privileged position of the great Powers on the Court sound still less convincing than forty years ago. K Wolfke 'The Privileged Position' (n 3) 164.
